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 In the global financial crisis and its aftermath, central banks have undertaken 
unprecedented actions of many kinds. This raises a natural question:  has the the crisis revealed 
that the previous consensus framework for monetary policy was inadequate, and should now 
be fundamentally reconsidered?  It is surely true that central banks were not too well prepared 
for the crisis, and that new policies had to be created to a large extent on the fly. And it would 
obviously be desirable to try to learn from this experience, in order to be better prepared for an 
appropriate response next time, and perhaps even to reduce the probability of there being a 
“next time” as well.   
  But I don’t think that this means that all of the previous conventional wisdom must now 
be discarded.  In particular, I don’t think it has been shown to have been a mistake for central 
banks to commit themselves to explicit, quantitative inflation targets.  Inflation targeting, and 
also the “implicit inflation targeting” that was practiced by some other central banks, has 
resulted in a high degree of stability of medium run inflation expectations during the crisis and 
its aftermath, and I believe that this has improved the stability of the real economy as well. If 
the prolonged high unemployment of the past several years had led to a deflationary spiral, our 
situation would surely have been far worse.  I believe that this has been a benefit of the 
credibility for inflation stabilization achieved by the Fed and other central banks in the years 
prior to the crisis, and not something that we should want casually to discard.  
 Nevertheless, I think it is important to stress that inflation targeting need not mean and 
should not mean the caricature of it that one sometimes hears, according to which inflation 
targeting should mean making inflation control the sole objective of policy at all times, on the 
view that inflation stabilization will by itself be sufficient to guarantee macroeconomic stability.  
Recent events have obviously cast considerable doubt on the latter, overly simplistic view.  
However, it’s important to remember that this had not been the view advocated by most 
proponents of inflation targeting even before the crisis.  Mervyn King famously called that view 
the “inflation nutter” position in one of his classic early discussions of the theory of inflation 
targeting,1 and argued instead for a more flexible form of inflation targeting.  Other leading 
proponents of inflation targeting, such as Ben Bernanke and Lars Svensson, also consistently 
argued for a flexible conception of inflation targeting.2  Under this doctrine, it was important to 
conduct monetary policy in such a way as to maintain medium-run inflation expectations 
relatively constant at the pre-announced target rate; but it was permissible to allow temporary 
departures of the inflation rate from this medium-run target, for the sake of other stabilization 
objectives.  A near-term inflation rate near the target was neither necessary nor sufficient for 
good policy.   
But this doctrine, while sensible as far as it goes, does leave an important question 
unanswered: what does it mean to conduct policy in the short run in such a way as to ensure 
that medium-run inflation expectations should remain anchored, even though one is not always 
acting to keep inflation as close as possible to the medium-run target?  Inflation-targeting 
central banks talk a lot about how they seek to assess whether inflation expectations are still 
anchored, and whether their internal models still forecast an inflation rate near the target some 
years in the future; but they are frequently less clear about what it is about the way in which 
1 Mervyn A. King,  “Changes in UK Monetary Policy: Rules and Discretion in Practice,”  Journal of Monetary 
Economics 39: 81-97 (1997). 
2 See, for example, Ben S. Bernanke and Frederic S. Mishkin, “Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary 
Policy?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 1997, pp. 97-116; Ben S. Bernanke et al., Inflation Targeting, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999; Lars E.O. Svensson, “Inflation Targeting: Some Extensions,” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101: 337-361 (1999); and Lars E.O. Svensson, “Inflation Targeting as a Monetary 
Policy Rule,” Journal of Monetary Economics 43: 607-654 (1999). 
                                                 
they intend to make policy decisions that would make that a correct expectation.  
 Vagueness on this point didn’t create great difficulties in the 15 years or so of relative 
macroeconomic stability prior to the global financial crisis.  But when larger disturbances occur, 
the incompleteness of the flexible inflation-targeting doctrine becomes more of a problem.  
Inflation-targeting central banks have recently been conducting policy in ways that don’t seem 
to be directly dictated by their inflation-targeting framework; but that raises questions about 
whether the framework still remains in effect.  
 In my view, flexible inflation-targeting doesn’t need to be repudiated as a policy 
framework, but it does need to be completed.  Inflation-targeting central banks need to commit 
themselves not only to a medium-run inflation target, but also to criteria for making nearer-
term policy decisions that will, among other desiderata, imply that the inflation rate should be 
near the target on average, if one averages over a sufficient number of years.3  
 As an example of such a criterion, a central bank might commit itself to make short run 
decisions so as to keep nominal GDP as close as possible to a particular target path, even in the 
nearer term.  The target path for nominal GDP could be chosen so that keeping nominal GDP on 
that path should ensure, over the medium run, an average inflation rate equal to the inflation 
target.  At the same time, it would imply that inflation would not be the sole determinant of 
short-run policy decisions.  For example, a loosening of policy might be appropriate even when 
3 For further discussion of the desirability of such an intermediate “target criterion,” see Michael Woodford, 
Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003, 
chapter 7; “The Case for Forecast Targeting as a Monetary Policy Strategy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 
2007, pp. 3-24; and “Forecast Targeting as a Monetary Policy Strategy: Policy Rules in Practice,” in E.F. Koenig, R. 
Leeson, and J.B. Taylor, eds., The Taylor Rule and the Transformation of Monetary Policy, Stanford, CA: Hoover 




                                                 
inflation is not running below target, because insufficient real growth has resulted in a level of 
nominal GDP below the target path.4  
 Another respect in which inflation-targeting doctrine prior to the crisis has proven to be 
incomplete is in its failure to say how policy should be conducted if aggregate demand remains 
insufficient to achieve the central bank’s stabilization targets, even when the zero lower bound 
on short-term nominal interest rates is reached, as it has been in many countries over the last 
few years.  
 One approach used by several central banks has been “forward guidance” --- indications 
by the central bank that interest rates will remain low in the future, as a substitute for further 
immediate interest-rate cuts.  Such announcements do seem to have been able to influence 
market expectations about future short-term rates, and hence to influence longer-term interest 
rates and other asset prices.  But important questions remain about the form that such forward 
guidance should best take, and about how the existence of such statements should constrain 
subsequent policy decisions.   
One question is whether forward guidance should take the form of a statement about 
future policy intentions, or if it suffices for the central bank to offer a forecast of its likely future 
decisions, given the future conditions that can be anticipated at present.  The idea of merely 
offering a forecast has had a certain appeal to central bankers, since it doesn’t tie the hands of 
4 A nominal GDP target path can be viewed as a simpler version of the proposal of a target path for an “output-
gap-adjusted price level,” a proposal that can be shown to represent a theoretical ideal in certain New Keynesian 
models, as discussed in Michael Woodford, “Optimal Monetary Stabilization Policy,” in B.M. Friedman and M. 
Woodford, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. 3B, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2011. On the advantages of a 
nominal GDP target path as a practical proposal, see Michael Woodford, “Methods of Policy Accommodation at 
the Interest-Rate Lower Bound,” in The Changing Policy Landscape, Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City, 2012; and “Inflation Targeting: Fix It, Don’t Scrap It,” in L.Reichlin and R. Baldwin, eds., Is Inflation Targeting 
Dead? Central Banking After the Crisis,  London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2013. 
                                                 
the future policy committee. Unfortunately, there is no obvious reason for a mere forecast to 
be effective in stimulating demand.  
 In order for a central bank forecast of future interest rates to change market 
expectations, it would have either to reveal new information about likely future conditions, or 
new information about the central bank’s future policy reaction function.  But convincing 
people that interest rates will remain low for longer than they had previously expected, either 
because the economic recovery will be slower than previously expected or because deflation is 
coming, and not because of any change in the central bank’s reaction function, should be 
expected to have a contractionary rather than an expansionary effect on current expenditure.5   
This is surely not the aim of forward guidance at the zero lower bound.  Hence, in order to be 
effective, the announcement must communicate a different view of the future reaction 
function, that is, of the conditions under which policy will or will not be tightened in the future. 
But if this is the goal, a mere forecast of future interest rates is not the most effective 
way to change expectations.  If a central bank intends to conduct policy later in a way that is 
different from what people in the markets would already expect, then it should seek to 
communicate that intention, by talking directly about how future policy decisions will be made.  
 What kind of statements about future policy decisions would be desirable if that were 
one’s aim?  Recently, several central banks have made statements about specific dates until 
which the policy rate is expected to remain at its lower bound. But while traders and financial 
markets are certainly interested in hearing about such dates, I don’t think that a date-based 
approach makes sense as a way of communicating about future policy intentions.  It would not 
5 For further discussion, see Woodford, “Methods of Policy Accommodation,” cited above. 
                                                 
make sense, after all, for a central bank to actually bind itself not to consider raising rates 
before a specific date as far as two years in the future regardless of what may occur in the 
interim. Hence it is hard for date-based forward guidance to be understood as a genuine 
communication of policy intentions rather than as a mere forecast.   
 A better approach will instead specify economic conditions that must be reached in 
order for it to be appropriate to raise the policy rate.  Such a statement should allow market 
participants to form judgments about the likely length of time for which low rates should 
continue, but it will imply that the actual lift off date would depend on future outcomes, as 
indeed it should.  
 The recent move of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee to replace date-based 
forward guidance by explicit numerical thresholds for economic indicators is a desirable step, in 
my view.  The thresholds, however, have had to be determined on an ad hoc basis, and don’t 
obviously follow from previously announced policy targets. Nor do they indicate the policy that 
one should expect the FOMC to follow after the current anomalous period.  
 Under the version of flexible inflation targeting that I’ve just proposed, instead, the 
criterion for “liftoff” from the zero lower bound could follow from the same target criterion 
that guides policy decisions at other times.  A central bank that seeks to use its policy 
instruments to keep nominal GDP on a certain, steady growth path could also, when the zero 
lower bound makes it unable to prevent a sustained shortfall of nominal GDP relative to the 
target path, commit itself to maintain unusual policy accommodation until nominal GDP can be 
brought back to that target path, even though this would mean seeking higher than average 
nominal growth during a transitional period.6  
 An approach of this kind to forward guidance during a zero lower bound episode would 
have two advantages over the ad hoc approach.  First, it would provide an explanation for 
pursuing unusually aggressive policies in the aftermath of a zero lower bound episode, even as 
monetary stimulus begins to have effects, and it would do this in a way that should not create 
doubts about the cumulative increase in prices that might occur before the policy has ended --- 
for the existence of a target path for the level of nominal GDP, and a target that has not been 
raised as a result of the crisis, implies that nominal growth should indeed be capped.  And the 
pursuit of such a temporary policy would remain perfectly consistent with a stated intention to 
pursue a subsequent approach to policy --- namely keeping nominal GDP near that target path -
--- that should once again deliver an average inflation rate near the long-run inflation target.  
 The second advantage that I see is that if such a policy were to be expected to be 
followed as soon as the zero lower bound is reached, such an anticipation should have a 
stabilizing effect, reducing the distortions associated with the zero lower bound on interest 
rates.  If a decline in nominal GDP growth owing to an inability to cut the policy rate below the 
zero lower bound were expected to automatically imply faster nominal GDP growth later to 
undo the shortfall, this anticipation should reduce the size of that initial shortfall.   
 I’ve said earlier that I believe that confidence that central banks would not allow 
inflation to drift permanently below their long-run inflation targets has been a stabilizing factor 
in the recent crisis.  In the same way, I believe that had there been an already existing 
6 The way that this would work, and advantages of this proposal over the kind of thresholds introduced by the 
FOMC, are discussed further in Michael Woodford, “Forward Guidance by Inflation Targeting Central Banks,” 
paper prepared for the Sveriges Riksbank conference “Two Decades of Inflation Targeting,” June 3, 2013. 
                                                 
commitment to a nominal GDP target path, this should have been an even greater stabilizing 
factor.  
 Finally, another question raised by the recent crisis is whether central banks should have 
paid more attention to the growing risks to financial stability before the crisis. Or, to pose the 
more practical question for us now, to what extent should central banks consider risks to 
financial stability when making monetary policy decisions going forward?   
 Certainly this issue can’t be dismissed as easily as it often was before the crisis.  A 
popular argument then was that it was difficult to be sure a bubble was forming before it burst, 
and that it was therefore more practical not to consider the question until after the crash, and 
use monetary policy then to deal with the consequences of the crash.  But surely recent events 
have dented our confidence about how easy it is to “mop up after the crash” with the tools 
actually available to central banks.  
 It therefore makes sense going forward to seek to assess potential risks to financial 
stability before they grow too large, as difficult as that undoubtedly will be.  This does not, 
however, mean that monetary policy should be the only line of defense.  To say that monetary 
policy might have some capacity to restrain the growth of dangerous degrees of leverage 
doesn’t imply that no other measures to restrain such developments should be needed, if only 
we had a sound monetary policy.  
 Using monetary policy for this purpose, even under the assumption that it could be fully 
effective, would surely have costs in terms of decreasing the extent to which monetary policy 
can simultaneously achieve its usual stabilization objectives.  Hence, it behooves us to seek to 
improve financial regulation, and to develop instruments of macroprudential policy as well.  
Multiple instruments should increase the extent to which multiple objectives can 
simultaneously be pursued, and they are much to be desired in this case.  
 Still, in our current situation, without yet having these alternative policies that can be 
relied upon to fully eliminate the issue of controlling risks to financial stability, how should 
monetary policy take account of the issue?  I think one must recognize that simply tracking the 
outlook for measures of inflation and real activity is not, in general, going to be sufficient for 
sound monetary policy decisions.  It may well be that under most circumstances, risks to 
financial stability will be small enough under all of the currently contemplated interest rate 
decisions for interest rate policy to be set purely on the basis of expected consequences for 
inflation and output.  But one should at least recognize the possibility of exceptions to that 
situation, and keep an eye out for them.  
 This means that the proposal that interest rate policy be used to keep nominal GDP on a 
fixed target path that I’ve just been describing should not be viewed as an absolute rule.  It 
might well be reasonable, under some circumstances, to maintain tighter policy in order to 
restrain excessive growth of leverage even if this requires nominal GDP to fall below the target 
path.  But this would not, in my view, make the existence of a nominal GDP target path 
pointless.   
 In particular, I believe that even in the case of a temporary departure from the nominal 
GDP target path because of financial stability concerns, it makes sense for the central bank to 
remain committed to eventually reach that target path again, through a subsequent period of 
higher than average nominal growth to make up for the previous period of insufficient nominal 
growth.7  The argument is the same as in the case of the zero lower bound; an expectation that 
current undershooting of the nominal GDP target path will subsequently be compensated by a 
period of higher nominal GDP growth should reduce the extent to which a temporarily high 
policy rate causes nominal GDP to undershoot in the first place.  
 To the extent that such anticipation effects occur, they should reduce the tension 
between the goals of restraining risks to financial stability on the one hand, and of maintaining 
macroeconomic stability on the other. This is another advantage of modifying the 
understanding of flexible inflation targeting in the more ambitious way that I’ve just sketched.   
    
   
 
7 See Michael Woodford, “Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability,” Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2012:1, 
pp. 7-32, for analytical demonstration that a rule of this kind represents an optimal policy commitment, in the 
context of a simply New Keynesian model with a trade-off between the three goals of inflation stabilization, 
output-gap stabilization, and minimization of the economic distortions associated with financial crises. The rule 
shown there to be optimal generalizes the optimal policy rule for a New Keynesian model that abstracts from 
endogenous risks to financial stability; thus it actually involves a target path for an output-gap-adjusted price level, 
rather than for nominal GDP. Under the optimal commitment, the deterministic target path for this variable is not 
shifted, either by variations in financial risk or by the occurrence of financial crises; but temporary departures from 
the target path are justified in proportion to variations in a “marginal crisis risk” variable. The variant with a 
constant target path for nominal GDP is intended as an approximation to the optimal rule derived there (which is 
however only exactly optimal under quite specific assumptions). 
 
                                                 
